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BARGAINING IN THE SHADOW OF
RATE-SETTING COURTS
DANIEL A. CRANE*
Judges will tell you that they are comparatively poor rate regulators.'
The specialized, technical competence and supervisory capacity that
public utilities commissions enjoy are usually absent from judicial cham-
bers. Nonetheless, when granting antitrust remedies-particularly reme-
dies for monopolistic abuse of intellectual property-courts sometimes
purport to act as rate regulators for the licensing or sale of the defen-
dant's assets.
At the outset, we should distinguish between two forms ofjudicial rate
setting. In one form, a court (or the FTC in its adjudicative capacity)
grants a compulsory license and sets a specific rate as part of a final
judgment or an order. The established rate merges with the final judg-
ment, just like a damages award, requiring no further action from the
court. Examples here include the FFC's recent decisions in Rambus' and
N-Data,3 where the Commission's order either set an actual rate or a
* Professor, University of Michigan Law School; Bill Blumenthal, Doug Melamed, and
the other participants at the ABA Section of Antitrust Law Conference on Remedies for
Dominant Firm Misconduct at the University of Virginia School of Law provided many
helpful comments on an earlier draft.
I See, e.g., Arsberry v. Illinois, 244 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir. 2001) (referring to rate set-
ting as "a task [courts] are inherently unsuited to perform competently"); In re Coordi-
nated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 906 F.2d 432, 445 (9th
Cir. 1990) ("The federal courts generally are unsuited to act as rate-setting commis-
sions."); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 294 (2d Cir. 1979) (re-
jecting "judicial oversight of pricing policies [that] would place the courts in a role akin
to that of a public regulatory commission").
2 Rambus, Inc., FTC Docket No. 9302, 2007-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 75,585, at 107,065
(Feb. 2, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/070205opinion.pdf,
rev'd, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
3 Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, FTC Docket No. 051-0094, 2008 WL 258,308, at
App. D (Jan. 22, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510094/080122do.
pdf (requiring defendant to offer paid-up, royalty-free patent license for specified field of
use in exchange for one-time fee of $1,000).
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maximum rate for patent licenses.4 The Supreme Court has suggested
that such compulsory licensing and judicial rate setting may be a pre-
ferred remedy in cases of monopolistic abuse of patents.
5
Another form of antitrust remedy involves merely potential judicial
rate setting. Here, the relevant judgment requires the defendant to li-
cense on reasonable (or reasonable and nondiscriminatory-RAND)
terms and reserves jurisdiction for any potential licensee who is un-
happy with the rate offered by the defendant to petition the court to set
a rate. Significantly, however, such 'jurisdiction retention" judgments
do not necessarily involve a court in ever setting a rate. Instead, the
mere threat of rate setting frames future licensing negotiations. The li-
censor comes to the bargaining table bereft of the power to impose mo-
nopolistic royalty rates, given that the licensee can always appeal to a
court to set a monopoly-free rate.
This essay is largely concerned with the latter form of judicial rate
setting-the jurisdiction retention mode-about which it makes three
general points. First, judges' lack of expertise to set rates should not be
thought a major detraction from this sort of remedy. Courts rarely exer-
cise their rate-setting powers even when they retain them. The interest-
ing question is not whether courts are any good at setting rates-they
are not, but that may not matter-but what happens to the bargain of
the licensor and the licensee when the shadow of a rate-setting court lies
upon them.6 The short answer is that the shadow of a rate-setting court,
as distinguished from the more amorphous shadow of a damages-assess-
ing antitrust court, makes equality the dominant norm in the licensing
of intellectual property. However egalitarian the general impulse of lib-
eral society, it is not clear that equality is such a desirable norm when it
comes to the licensing of intellectual property. Even so, in cases where
the defendant has acquired monopoly power unlawfully, it is useful to
have it bargaining with licensees under the shadow of an undefined cap
on what it can demand as royalties.
4 Sometimes, a court has ordered licensing on reasonable terms and retained jurisdic-
tion to set a rate, but the government and defendants have then agreed on a rate sched-
ule that has become incorporated into a post-judgment consent decree. See, e.g., Maul
Bros., Inc. v. Emhart Corp., 356 F.2d 628 (6th Cir. 1966).
5 Besser Mfg. Co. v. United States, 343 U.S. 444, 449 (1952) ("Compulsory licensing
and sale of patented devices are recognized remedies. They would seem particularly ap-
propriate where, as here, a penchant for abuses of patent rights is demonstrated.").
6 The "shadow of the law" metaphor is generally ascribed to Robert H. Mnookin &
Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950
(1979).
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Second, whatever disinclinations we may otherwise have to allow
judges to impose a rate-setting regime as an antitrust remedy, the tenta-
tive trend of intellectual property law is toward an increased judicial
rate-setting function. Copyright has long embraced a number of com-
pulsory licensing regimes. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in
eBay v. MercExchange,7 patent, too, may be heading away from a right-to-
exclude property regime toward a right-to-collect-royalties liability re-
gime. The objections to courts as intellectual property rate setters may
diminish if intellectual property continues to be de-propertized and
courts grow more active in setting prospective royalty rates in intellec-
tual property infringement cases. Will familiarity breed contempt or ac-
ceptance? This remains to be seen, but it is clear that the fate of rate-
setting provisions in consent decrees is tied to the fate of liability re-
gimes in intellectual property more generally.
Third, when in doubt about the wisdom of imposing an antitrust rem-
edy, consider how businesses vote with their feet when given a relatively
unfettered choice. Intellectual property owners are increasingly choos-
ing to precommit to RAND licensing and judicial rate setting in order to
avoid antitrust liability for various exercises of intellectual property
rights, such as participation in standard-setting organizations (SSOs) or
patent pools. In other words, intellectual property rights holders are
choosing to blend liability and remedy by stipulating that a court can set
the rate for their intellectual property, so long as the hammer of anti-
trust liability for damages or injunction is kept from striking.' At a mini-
mum, this shows that a judicial rate-setting function is not uniformly
hostile to the interests of intellectual property owners-at least given the
alternatives. More expansively, it suggests that the line between liability
and remedy need not be so bright.
I. JUDICIAL RATE SETTING IN PRACTICE (OR NOT)
Antitrust decrees that require the defendants to license their intellec-
tual property on reasonable terms and retain jurisdiction in the court to
determine what is reasonable are said to create "rate-setting courts," as if
the decree actually brought into existence a new form of court with reg-
ulatory jurisdiction over the defendant's licensing practices. In fact, the
decree creates no new institution, but merely commits the court to en-
7 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
8 To be sure, privately ordered intellectual property regimes like SSOs require RAND
commitments for reasons other than avoiding antitrust liability. However, antitrust avoid-
ance is one of the perceived benefits. See Justin Hurwitz, The Value of Patents in Industry
Standards: Avoiding License Arbitrage with Voluntary Rules, 36 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 4 (2008) (noting
that the "root of the [RAND commitment] problem lies in antitrust law").
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force its judgment through further specification in the future. Two
questions are presented: (1) how often do such rate-setting courts actu-
ally set rates; and (2) what effect does the rate-setting court have on the
parties who bargain in its shadow?
A. A RELATIVELY LITTLE-PRACTICED ART
The archetypical model of the rate-setting court is the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York in its capacity as the guard-
ian of the ASCAP and BMI consent decrees. Since 1941, ASCAP, a music
performance rights clearinghouse, has been operating under a consent
decree (modified in 1950 and 2000) that requires ASCAP to license cer-
tain musical performance rights to all comers, and retains jurisdiction in
the district court to set a rate in the event that the parties are unable to
agree on one.9 Over the decades the ASCAP consent decree has been in
place, the district court has had to set a rate on a number of occasions,
including 1970 (CBS)10; 1987 (Buffalo Broadcasting)"; 1989 (Show-
time/The Movie Channel) 12 ; 1994 (Capital Cities, et al.) 13 ; 1995 (Fox) 14;
1997 (Salem Media/New England Continental Media) 15; 1999 (National
Cable Television Association-Interim rate)16; 2004 (Muzak and
DMX)I7 ; 2008 (AOL). 8 This count does not include cases where a party
asked the court to set a rate but the court declined. 9
See United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 981 F. Supp. 199,
201 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (explaining terms of consent decree).
"0 CBS. v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 320 F. Supp. 389 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
"1 United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, No. 13-95, 1993 WL
60,687, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (reporting on interim rate setting in Buffalo Broadcasting
litigation).
12 United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, No. 13-95, 1989 WL
222,654, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
13 United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 157 F.R.D. 173
(S.D.N.Y. 1994).
14 United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 870 F. Supp. 1211
(S.D.N.Y. 1995).
15 United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 981 F. Supp. 199
(S.D.N.Y. 1997).
16 United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, No. 13-95, 1999 WL
335,376, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
7 United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 333 F. Supp. 2d 215
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
18 United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 485 F. Supp. 2d 438
(S.D.N.Y. 2007). The order in this case, setting the royalty rate for downloading of digital
music files over the Internet, was entered April 30, 2008.
19 See, e.g., United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors-& Publishers, 331 F.2d 117
(2d Cir. 1964) (holding that ASCAP was not required to issue the kinds of licenses
requested).
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The BM/"rate-setting court" has been less active, but only because the
BML consent decree did not provide for rate setting until it was
amended in 1994.20 The first rate-setting decision under the 1994
amendment-in which the district court set a rate for a licensee's per-
formance of music via cable and satellite-occurred in 2001.21 The
docket sheet reflects one or two other occasions when a party filed to
commence a rate-setting proceeding but withdrew its request after
agreeing on a rate with BMI. In a separate action, not filed under the
principal BM! docket, the Southern District of New York also set a rate
in 2007.22
Although the ASCAP rate-setting court has been relatively active in
recent years and the BM/ court has had two rate-setting proceedings in
its first fourteen years, it would be a mistake to generalize about the
effects of rate-setting provisions from the amount of activity under the
performance rights organizations (PROs) consent decrees. ASCAP and
BMI engage in thousands of licensing transactions on behalf of hun-
dreds of thousands of composers, songwriters, lyricists, and music pub-
lishers, and only a small fraction of these end up in rate-setting
proceedings. 23 Further, the PROs' licensing business is comprehensively
regulated by the consent decrees.
By contrast, the run-of-the-mill antitrust decree with a reasonable roy-
alty licensing provision-typically for patents-has typically involved lit-
tle more than a nominal role for the "rate-setting court." Table 124 in the
Appendix summarizes fifty-two decree provisions with reasonable licens-
ing provisions for patents or copyrights and retention of jurisdiction for
the district court to set a rate in the event the parties cannot agree. Not
20 See generally RCHARD A. EPSTEIN,. ANTITRUST CONSENT DECREES IN THEORY AND PRAC-
TICE 32-34 (2007) (discussing drawbacks of having ASCAP rate-regulated while BMI was
not).
21 See United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 426 F.3d 91, 92 (2d Cir. 2005) (Music Choice).
22 Broad. Music, Inc. v. Weigel Broad. Co., 488 F. Supp. 2d 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
23 See http://www.ascap.com/about/ (reporting that ASCAP represents more than
330,000 U.S. composers, songwriters, lyricists, and music publishers); http://www.bmi.
com/about/?link=navbar (reporting that BMI represents 375,000 songwriters, composers,
and music publishers).
24 Table 1 includes only decrees that contained a specific retention-of-jurisdiction pro-
vision allowing interested third parties to seek a rate determination. It excludes many
other antitrust decrees that include other forms of reasonable royalty provisions. For ex-
ample, the 2001 Microsoft consent decree requires Microsoft to license (on reasonable and
nondiscriminatory terms) to ISVs, IHVs, IAPs, ICPs, and OEMs any intellectual property
rights owned or licensable by Microsoft that are required to exercise any of the options or
alternatives expressly provided to those entities under the Final Judgment. The decree,
however, does not allow the specified third parties to directly enforce the decree through
a rate-setting procedure. New York v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D.D.C. 2002),
affd sub nom. Massachusetts v. Microsoft Corp., 373 F.3d 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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surprisingly, the results show that most rate-setting courts have to exer-
cise their rate-setting function very rarely, if ever. The fifty-two cases in
which I identified a retention-of-jurisdiction provision mostly dated
from the 1940s, 1950s, or 1960s, suggesting that rate-setting provisions
for intellectual property have fallen out of favor more recently. In only
three of them-ASCAP, BMli, and American Optical25-could I identify
any evidence that a court was ever called upon to set a rate for intellec-
tual property.
2 6
Unless we count the PRO outliers where rate-setting decisions seem to
be made every few years, it seems that judicial rate setting by consent
decree is extremely rare. One possible interpretation is that rate setting
is rare simply because the Justice Department and the courts were
wrong to think that there was any need for antitrust intervention in the
first place. If we take the underlying antitrust claims seriously, however,
there is a different hypothesis: actual rate setting is rare because the
shadow of the rate-setting court frames the bargain sufficiently to elimi-
nate the defendant's ability to charge an unfettered monopoly price.
B. How DOES THE BARGAIN DIFFER?
Even if actual rate setting is rare, this does not mean that rate-setting
courts are irrelevant to the process of negotiation between intellectual
property rights holders and potential licensees. Juries are also extremely
rare in civil antitrust cases-about one percent of all civil antitrust cases
end up before them-but the institution of the jury casts a long shadow
over the entire structure of civil antitrust litigation, from the motion to
dismiss stage forward.27
So how does the shadow of the rate-setting court affect the bargain?
In order to answer this question intelligently, one has to ask "compared
to what?" The right point of comparison is bargaining in the shadow of
liability for antitrust damages, because a consent decree with a rate-set-
ting provision for intellectual property significantly diminishes the likeli-
hood that a court will find the defendant liable for antitrust damages in
the future. For example, when the Supreme Court effectively blessed
ASCAP and BMI's blanket licensing practices in light of their respective
consent decrees, it stated that "it cannot be ignored that the Federal
25 United States v. Am. Optical Co., 95 F. Supp. 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
26 In each case I tried to double-check the existence of any rate-setting decisions by
examining both the docket sheet and searching for reported decisions. As noted in the
Appendix, docket sheet information was unavailable for thirty of the cases.
271 make this point more completely in Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86
TEx. L. REv. 1159, 1184-88 (2008).
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Executive and Judiciary have carefully scrutinized ASCAP and the chal-
lenged conduct, have imposed restrictions on various of ASCAP's prac-
tices, and, by the terms of the decree, stand ready to provide further
consideration, supervision, and perhaps invalidation of asserted an-
ticompetitive practices."2 8 In a but-for world of a simple "cease and de-
sist" injunction, post-decree bargaining would occur in the shadow of
damages liability (with the decree itself serving as the licensee's whip
hand to establish liability in the event that the licensor exacted excessive
royalties) rather than that of the rate-setting court.
How the negotiating parties perceive the likely outcome of a rate-set-
ting proceeding will affect the shape of their bargain. So how would a
rate-setting court establishing the reasonable royalty to be charged for
intellectual property approach its task? Traditional rate regulation, of
the kind held constitutional by the Supreme Court,29 requires an evalua-
tion of a firm's cost and the setting of a sufficient rate for the regulated
entity to enjoy a reasonable return on its capital investment. It is not
surprising to find courts confessing their own incompetence to engage
in this sort of rate regulation. Courts are not institutionally equipped to
study a firm's cost structure in detail and figure out the difference be-
tween confiscatory, reasonable, and excessive rates.
Rate setting for intellectual property must follow a different set of
principles than the traditional cost-based approach. Obviously, marginal
cost pricing of intellectual property is not an option, since marginal
costs tend to be close to nothing.30 Nor is it reasonable to approach rate
regulation of intellectual property by trying to locate a firm's sunk capi-
tal costs. Simply allowing a firm to recover the sum of its sunk capital
costs and its marginal costs of production for any particular invention
would not be remunerative, since for every invention that succeeds
there tend to be many others that fail.31 In order to be completely remu-
nerative, a cost-based intellectual property rate regulation regime would
28 Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS., 441 U.S. 1, 13 (1979). Although the Supreme Court only
decided whether the ASCAP and BMI blanket licensing systems, as modified by the con-
sent decree, fell under the per se rule of illegality for price fixing, later decisions have
upheld blanket licensing under the rule of reason. See Buffalo Broad. Co. v. Am. Soc'y of
Composers, Authors & Publishers, 744 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1984).
29 See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877) (permitting rate regulation of grain
elevators and other industries affected with the public interest); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S.
466 (1898) (requiring rate regulators to allow regulated enterprise a reasonable return
on its capital investment).
30 See generally John F. Duffy, The Marginal Cost Controversy in Intellectual Property, 71 U.
CHI. L. REv. 37 (2004).
31 For example, it is well known that only a small fraction of new drugs invented by
pharmaceutical companies ever reach the market. See Michael A. Carrier, Two Puzzles Re-
solved: Of the Schumpeter-Arrow Stalemate and Pharmaceutical Innovation Markets, 93 IowA L.
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have to take account of the risk-adjusted investment in the relevant in-
vention. For example, if the research and development cost leading to
the production of a drug was $100, the ex ante likelihood that this R&D
program would produce a commercially viable drug was 50 percent, and
the marginal cost of producing the drug was $20, then the appropriate
cost-based rate would be $220 (not counting the allowance for a reason-
able "profit"). 32 Neither courts nor administrative agencies are likely up
to the task of engaging in this sort of ex ante risk assessment in order to
determine the appropriate rate.
Courts involved in prospective rate setting of intellectual property
have limited tools at their disposal. The widely used Georgia-Pacific fac-
tors,3 3 which guide decisions about the appropriate royalty rate in patent
infringement cases, provide only limited guidance for judges who are
setting a royalty as a remedy for an antitrust violation. The goal of the
antitrust remedy exercise is to strip away the incremental monopoly
power obtained by the antitrust violation, but many of the most impor-
tant Georgia-Pacific factors assume the patentee's current market position
as the appropriate baseline. For example, factor one focuses on the roy-
alties currently being received by the patentee; factor eight focuses on
the established profitability of the product made under the patent; fac-
tor eleven focuses on the profitability of the infringer's use of the inven-
tion; and factor fifteen asks what amount the patentee and the infringer
would have agreed upon at the time the infringement began (i.e., a time
before the determination of antitrust liability) if both had been reasona-
bly and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement. 4 The Georgia-Pacific
factors are more useful in solving hold-out problems than they are in
locating the monopoly-free royalty rate.35
In fact, the few available examples from antitrust rate courts suggest
that comparability to external benchmarks is the chief guiding princi-
REv. 393, 419 (2007) (reporting percentages of drugs reaching the market at three
clinical study phases).
321 am assuming that the marginal costs are only incurred after it is known that the
drug will be commercially successful (i.e., it has received FDA approval and has been
shown effective in clinical trials) and therefore there is no need to adjust the marginal
costs of production for risk.
33 Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(identifying fifteen factors to be used in calculating patent royalty rates).
34
1d.
35 To be more precise, in a remedial rate-setting proceeding, the correct rate is not
necessarily a monopoly-free rate-since the defendant may have had monopoly power
even before its violation-but a ratenot reflecting any incremental monopoly power de-
rived from the violation.
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ple. 36 A good example of this is the first (and, thus far, only). rate-setting
proceeding under the BM[ consent decree. When Music Choice, a cable
and Internet music channel provider, sought a rate from BMI, the rate
setting bounced up and down between the district court and the court
of appeals on the issue of how the rate set for Music Choice should
compare to the contractually agreed rate between BMI and DMX-Mu-
sic Choice's competitor.
37
Benchmarking may be the best that rate-setting courts can do, but it is
highly imperfect as a remedial mechanism. First, as with the use of the
more expansive Georgia-Pacific factors, benchmarking suffers from the
fact that the rest of the market-including the benchmark contracts-
may already be the products of the defendant's monopoly power. It
does not improve things much in terms of antitrust values to say that
applicant X gets the same rate as firm Y got a year ago if the rate that
firm Y got was itself inflated by the defendant's elimination of
competition.
3 8
Second, it is not clear that equality is a very useful norm for setting
prices for intellectual property. Price discrimination is perhaps the best
way that intellectual property rights owners have to recover the high
fixed costs of creating information. 39 Indeed, intellectual property is
often priced discriminatorily even in markets where it has economic
substitutes. 4 Elsewhere, I have argued that the "nondiscriminatory"
prong of RAND commitments should be read as a commitment not to
price discriminate in such a way as to increase downstream market
power, but that it should not be read as a general equal-royalty commit-
ment, lest RAND commitments frustrate efficient price discrimination
schemes.4' But if comparability is all that courts have to go on in setting
36 See United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 426 F.3d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 2005) ("A rate court's
determination of the fair market value of the music is often facilitated by the use of
benchmarks-agreements reached after arm's length negotiation between other similar
parties in the industry.").
37 The history of the rate-setting proceeding is recounted in id. at 92-93.
38 SeeAm. Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers v. Showtime/The Movie Channel,
Inc., 912 F.2d 563, 577 (2d Cir. 1990) (trial court opinion) (noting that "since there is no
competitive market in music rights, the parties and the Court lack any economic data that
may be readily translated into a measure of competitive pricing for the rights in
question").
39 See CARI. SHAPIRO & HAL VAUAR.N, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GuIDE TO THE
NETWORK ECONOMY 299 (1999).
40 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCrURE OF IN--EL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 377 (2003).
41 See Daniel A. Crane, Patent Pools, RAND Commitments, and the Problematics of Price Dis-
crimination, in WORKING WITHIN THE BOUNDAIES OF INTELLECTuAL PROPERTY LAW
(Rochelle Dreyfuss et al. eds., forthcoming) (draft on file with author).
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royalty rates, then it is not hard to imagine that price discrimination will
be thwarted.
In principle, the correct matrix for rate setting as an antitrust remedy
is to place the burden on the licensor to justify its proposed royalty rate
using a model that assumes, counterfactually, the presence or threat of
competition in the market. Rates should be justified as those that would
prevail in a market reflecting the status quo absent the challenged con-
duct.42 If the licensor seeks to engage in price discrimination, it should
present a model showing that the particular pricing strategy adopted
would be viable in a world where licensees could turn to substitute licen-
sors in the event they were dissatisfied with the rates offered.
The conceptually correct model, like most others, is easier to articu-
late in theory than to apply in practice. And it is not clear that, should
courts become more involved in consent decree rate setting, they would
gravitate toward this norm. So perhaps the most we can say descriptively
about the bargain in the shadow is that it is influenced by the knowledge
that there is an undefined cap on how much the defendant can charge.
That alone may be a useful feature of consent decrees in cases of true
monopoly power.
II. PROPERTY RULES, LIABILITY RULES, AND
JUDICIAL GRAVITATION
Judicial rate setting for intellectual property is not a new phenome-
non. A compulsory license to make and distribute phonorecords-the
"mechanical" license-was enacted as early as 1909. 43 However, there is
a significant difference between copyright's statutory compulsory licens-
ing system and that created on an ad hoc basis under antitrust consent
decrees: the statutory system allowed for the creation of specialized rate-
setting tribunals (initially the Copyright Royalty Tribunal44 and since
2005 the Copyright Royalty Board45).
42 Again, the defendant would be allowed to assume that amount of market power that
it had before the alleged misconduct. For example, if prior to relevant conduct the defen-
dant held a valuable patent that would allow it to charge $1 above a competitive level and
after the relevant conduct it was able to charge $2 above the competitive level, the rate-
setting court should allow it to charge $1, since the point of rate setting is to restore
competitive pricing, not to penalize.
4
3 Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, §§ 1(e), 25(e), 35 Stat. 1075, 1075-76,
1081-82 (1909).
44 See, e.g., Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 662 F.2d 1
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (reviewing rate-setting decision of Copyright Royalty Tribunal).
45 See http://www.loc.gov/crb/laws/.
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As noted at the outset, judges often claim that they are ill-equipped to
engage in rate setting. Judges claim that they are much better at deter-
mining past damages or fines and enjoining future misconduct than
they are at acting like regulators. Following Guido Calabresi and A.
Douglas Melamed's landmark article, 46 judges often claim a preference
for property rules, which in the context of intellectual property trans-
lates into the grant of past damages and a future injunction against in-
fringement, rather than liability rules, which require the court to
appraise the value of the defendant's property and set its future price.
47
A preference for property rules over liability rules undermines the
case for rate-setting provisions in consent decrees, since such provisions
essentially remove the "right to exclude" stick from the defendant's bun-
dle of intellectual property rights and replace it with a right to receive a
reasonable royalty, as determined by ajudge, when others use the defen-
dant's intellectual property. Whether property rules or liability rules
should govern intellectual property in general is beyond the scope of
this article.48 For now, it is enough to say a few words about historical
resistance to de-propertizing intellectual property in the context of con-
sent decrees and how recent developments in intellectual property law
may affect these attitudes in the long run.
A. THE CASE AGAINST JUDICIAL RATE SETTING
Perhaps the clearest expression of resistance to intellectual property
rate-setting provisions in antitrust consent decrees on institutional com-
petence grounds comes not from the institution that would actually be
involved in setting the rate-the judiciary-but instead from the Anti-
trust Division in its 1947 brief in National Lead, the titanium pigments
cartel case.49 At issue in National Lead was a provision in the 1945 Final
Decree entered by Judge Simon Rifkind of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York requiring the defendants, National
Lead and du Pont, to license all of their covered patents to any appli-
46 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienabil-
ity: One View of the Cathedra4 85 HAv. L. Riv. 1089 (1972).
47 See generally Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern
Information?, 85 TEX. L. REv. 783 (2007).
48 I explore these issues more fully in my forthcoming article, Daniel A. Crane, Intellec-
tual Liability, 88 TEX. L. REv. (forthcoming 2009). For additional discussion of these is-
sues, see Lemley & Weiser, supra note 47; Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property:
Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742 (2007); Robert P. Merges, Of
Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2655 (1994).
49 Brief of United States, United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (Jan. 20,
1947) (No. 89), available at 1947 WL 44,396 [hereinafter U.S. Brief in National Lead].
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cant at a "uniform, reasonable royalty."50 The court reserved jurisdiction
"to pass upon the reasonableness of any royalty or charge herein di-
rected to be reasonable," thus establishing a conventional "rate-setting
court."5
On appeal, the government asked the Supreme Court to modify the
decree by either permanently enjoining the defendants from enforcing
their patents or else to do the equivalent by requiring the defendants to
license their patents royalty-free.5 2 Part of the government's motivation
was certainly punitive-it did not want to see the guilty defendants enjoy
any fruits from their patents, the value of which had been pumped up by
the cartel behavior.53 As the Supreme Court pointed out, however, Na-
tional Lead was "a civil, not criminal proceeding" and the "purpose of the
decree, therefore, is effective and fair enforcement, not punishment.
54
That left the government to argue that rate setting of patents was simply
not an appropriate task for courts.
The centerpiece of the government's brief was a section entitled "Un-
workability of Reasonable Royalty Licensing as Antitrust Relief. '55 That
section was clearly calculated not simply to address the specific merits of
Judge Rifkind's decree, but to make a case against judicial rate setting in
antitrust cases, writ large. It began:
The practical difficulty of providing for reasonable royalties in a back-
ground of patent abuse and antitrust violation renders such relief un-
workable. These practical considerations, implicit in the rationale of
the rule terminating the enforceability of abused patents, are: 1. That
the evaluation of patents as part of antitrust relief against a back-
ground of abuse of patents, imposes on the courts an "onerous and
absorbing administrative burden." 2. That the fixing of a patent value
in terms of a royalty which will at the same time instill competition into
the industry and dissipate the effects of monopoly, requires judicial
regulation of the future economics of the industry, and is hence in-
compatible with our system of free enterprise.
56
50 United States v. Nat'l Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 328 (1947).
51 Id.
52 Id. at 335.
53 The government specifically worried that "any offhand determination of reasonable
royalty could easily reward the defendant patentee for (and burden competitors and the
public with the cost of) economic advantages resulting from its high level of know-how
rather than from advantages stemming directly and solely from the inventive features of
the processes, machinery or products covered by his patents." U.S. Brief in National Lead,
supra note 49, at *69.
54 National Lead, 332 U.S. at 338.
55 U.S. Brief in National Lead, supra note 49, at *63.
5
, Id. at *63-*64 (internal citations omitted).
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The government then laid out a detailed case againstjudicial rate set-
ting. Following its roadmap, the government first made the practical,
institutional competence case. Determining the prospective value of a
patent was simply too difficult for courts, even with the help of a special
master, since it almost impossible to "apportion [ ] to the invention only
its particular share of the total value of the product, process or appara-
tus of which it is a part."5 7 Another difficulty, which distinguished pro-
spective rate setting from retrospective damages determinations, was
that "determining the value of unexploited patents and applications of
patents for future use" could "only be decided on the basis of the most
conjectural kind of expert testimony."58 Readjustments over the years
would be inevitable.5 9 Should courts assume such responsibilities it
would "saddle[ ] the courts, the public, the injured parties, and prospec-
tive competitors with what may be years of litigation as a method of pro-
viding relief against antitrust violations."60
The government then moved on to its philosophical objection. Judi-
cial regulation of prices was antithetical to a free market society. It
would result in an "economic system determined by judicial regulation
rather than by the play of competitive forces in a free market."61 It would
require courts to choose between competing economic philosophies
and accounting principles-an inappropriate role for the judiciary.
62
In support of its contention that judicial rate regulation was inappro-
priate, the government relied on two price-fixing precedents-Trenton
Potteries63 and Socony-Vacuum64-that had rejected efforts by defendants
tojusify the prices set by a cartel as "reasonable." The government "sub-
mitted.., that the fixation of a reasonable royalty is no different [than]
a determination of the court as to whether or not an agreed price is
reasonable. '" 65 In other words, the very rule of per se illegality for cartels
also encompassed an implicit prohibition on remedial judicial rate
setting.
Here, history and context are important. The Antitrust Division of the
1940s was controlled by the Brandeisian wing of the New Deal coalition.
They were believers in atomistic competition "in which basic decisions
57 Id. at *65.
58 Id. at *66.
59 Id.
60 Id. at *70-*71.
61 Id. at *77.
62 Id.
6 United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
64 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
65 U.S. Brief in National Lead, supra note 49, at *77.
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were made in an impersonal market and the pursuit of self-interest pro-
duced the greatest social good."66 The intensity of the government's re-
sponse to the prospect of judicial rate setting can be understood as a
reaction to the regime that existed between the two cases cited by the
government-the experimentation with government-mediated industry
cartelization and planning during the brief era of the National Indus-
trial Recovery Act (1933-35). 67 In the second half of the New Deal
(roughly from 1936 to beginning of U.S. involvement in World War II),
such regulation of prices and conditions of sale rather than of the pro-
cess of competition was anathema.
The Supreme Court did not take the government's bait and involve
itself in the ideological struggle between the competing New Deal ideol-
ogies (as it had earlier in Socony-Vacuum).68 It noted that in the last two
years alone, the government had entered into six consent decrees with
reasonable royalty provisions69 and that the 1946 amendments to the
patent act specifically allowed for a "reasonable royalty" test for damages
calculations in patent infringement suits. 70 The decree stood.
Predictably, the government's doomsday predictions did not come
true. There are no reported decisions of any rate-setting activity under
the 1945 decree-no evidence of distraction of the court's mission, ex-
penditure of its resources, or unseemly judicial interference in the give
and take of the market. Presumably, as in most other cases where an
antitrust decree requires licensing of intellectual property on reasona-
ble terms with a reservation of jurisdiction, the parties bargained in the
shadow of the rate-setting court rather than litigating in rate-setting pro-
ceedings. Still, the concerns expressed by the government are emblem-
atic of a wider view that courts simply should not be in the rate-setting
business for intellectual property because they cannot do it well and be-
cause markets, not courts, should determine rates.
B. THE GRAVITATION TowARD LIABILITY RULES
The objection to judicial rate-setting provisions in antitrust consent
decrees would be strongest if courts otherwise treated intellectual prop-
erty rights as true property rights-i.e., they allowed for an unfettered
66 See ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY: A STUDY IN
ECONOMIC AMBIVALENCE 35 (2d ed. 1995).
67 See Daniel A. Crane, The Story of United States v. Socony-Vacuum: Hot Oil and Antitrust
in the Two New Deals, in ANTITRUST STORIES 91, 94-97 (Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel A. Crane
eds., 2007).
68Id. at 118-19.
69 332 U.S. at 350 n.9.
70 Id. at 349 n.8.
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right to exclude others from the invention. In that case, the ordinary
remedy for infringement of intellectual property rights would be dam-
ages for past infringement and an injunction against prospective in-
fringement. Judicial rate setting under consent decrees would be an
anomaly.
Before the Supreme Court's eBay decision, property rights protection
of patents was the norm and the consent decree, rate-setting treatment
was the aberration. The Federal Circuit, which generally controls the
law of patents, followed a "general rule that courts will issue permanent
injunctions against patent infringement absent exceptional circum-
stances."71 In eBay, however, a fractured Supreme Court rejected this
presumptive treatment of patents as property and held that, instead, the
ordinary permanent injunction rule-irreparable harm, no adequate
remedy at law, balance of hardships, and public interest-applied.
7
In light of eBay, injunctions no longer issue as a matter of right in
infringement cases. If a court decides not to issue the injunction, the
alternative is to allow the infringer to use the patents but to pay for
them. And, of course, that entails the court deciding how much the in-
fringer should pay for the patents-i.e., engaging in prospective judicial
rate setting.
It remains to be seen just how wide the impact of eBay will be. Al-
though the Court was unanimous in rejecting the Federal Circuit's "ab-
sent exceptional circumstances" standard, two concurring opinions
struck widely different notes about the value of injunctions for patent
infringement. Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia and Ginsburg,
believed that, even under the generic four-part permanent injunction
test, the historical practice in patent cases-of granting the injunction-
should usually prevail.73 Justice Kennedy,joined by Justices Stevens, Sou-
ter, and Breyer, believed that changed economic and technological ciri
cumstances-in particular, the rise of "patent trolls"-should make
courts more skeptical about granting patent injunctions.74 The deep
case for either property rules or liability rules remains to be made on
the Court.
In the meantime, the lower courts are taking a more nuanced ap-
proach toward patent infringement injunctions than they previously
71 MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc. 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 547
U.S. 388 (2006).
72 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006).
73 Id. at 394-95 (Roberts, J., concurring).
74 Id. at 395-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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did. Two years after the eBay decision, a commentator summarized the
early returns as follows:
(1) The district courts continue to grant permanent injunctions in
most cases; (2) Typically, permanent injunctions continue to issue
when the patent owner and the infringer are direct marketplace com-
petitors; (3) Typically, permanent injunctions are denied if the patent
owner is a non-practicing entity; and, (4) Other factors such as willful
infringement, venue, the existence of a complex invention incorporat-
ing a patented feature, the willingness of the patent owner to license
the invention and the likelihood of future infringement are not overly
predictive with regard to whether patent infringement will result in
issuance or denial of a permanent injunction.
75
In other words, we are not seeing a complete shift away from property
rules, but the number of ordinary patent infringement cases in which
courts engage in prospective rate setting is growing. Patent courts, like
antitrust courts, are increasingly rate-setting courts.
Assuming this trend continues, what will be the eBay decision's rele-
vance for rate setting under consent decrees? One possibility is that judi-
cial rate setting will be "normalized"-that it will come to be accepted as
an ordinary function with respect to patents, whether in infringement
cases or antitrust proceedings. In this "familiarity breeds respect" scena-
rio, antitrust consent decrees involving patents will merely extend ex-
isting judicial involvement in determining reasonable royalties for
prospective use. The only added wrinkle in the antitrust case-and it is a
large wrinkle7 6-is that the rate-setting court will have to determine the
fair value of the patent in the but-for world where market power arising
from an antitrust violation is absent.
The counter-scenario is that "familiarity breeds contempt." Assume
that the post-eBay world of judicial rate setting in a large number of
infringement cases comes to be viewed as a failure. Judges are seen as
routinely under-valuing intellectual property rights, leading to a diminu-
tion of inventive incentives. Infringers exploit the system by free riding
on the creations of others and disappearing when it is time to pay up.
Congress responds with an infringement remedy statute creating a
strong statutory presumption in favor of injunction. In such a world, the
Justice Department's admonitions in National Lead will resonate anew.
In a general movement back toward property rules for patents, we can
expect to see that antitrust remedies for patent abuse will look more like
71 Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Aftermath of eBay v. MercExchange, 126 S. C. 1837
(2006): A Review of Subsequent Judicial Decisions, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 631,
632 (2007).
76 See supra Part I.B.
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those advocated in the government's National Lead brief: the defendant
is stripped of its rights to enforce its patents or must license them for a
zero royalty. Or the court simply leaves the defendant's patents alone,
relying on the threat of future damages actions by aggrieved licensees to
discipline the patentee's behavior.
Which one of these scenarios will come true? At this point, it is too
early to say. For now, the most that we can say confidently is that the
future of antitrust rate courts is tied to the future -of intellectual prop-
erty remedies more generally.
III. ERASING THE LIABILITY-REMEDY LINE
Thus far, we have assumed that judicial rate setting is a remedy that
attaches after a liability determination. Conversations about remedy oc-
cur only once there has been a determination that the defendant vio-
lated the relevant legal norm. The articles in this symposium generally
are about what happens after a court has found a defendant guilty of an
antitrust violation. But the parties most immediately affected by antitrust
judgments-the plaintiff and the defendant-usually prefer to blur the
line between liability and remedy. We call this settlement. In rough
terms, out of one hundred private antitrust cases, seventy-five are invol-
untarily dismissed before a verdict, twenty-three are settled, and only
two are tried.7 7 Hence, private litigants vote for settlement over liability
determination by a roughly 12-1 margin in those cases that would other-
wise proceed to binary adjudication.
The settlement rate tells us that blurring the line between liability and
remedy is usually a Pareto-optimal solution in treble damages cases. In-
deed, those few cases that escape the jaws of pretrial motion practice
and settlement to parade before ajudge or jury are usually explained as
ones in which strong informational asymmetries, transactions costs, or
strategic considerations prevented an otherwise more efficient bar-
gained solution. In this final section, I briefly discuss the context of line
blurring in cases of antitrust and intellectual property and its potential
implications for the future of judicial rate setting.
A. RAND PRECOMMITMENTS
In the IP-antitrust context, the movement to blur the liability-remedy
line is underway. In recent years, some patentees participating in patent
77 See Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism, 96 CAL. L. REv. 1, 35 n.188 (2008) (citing
2001 to 2005 statistics, UNITED STATES COURTS, DIRECTOR'S ANNUAL REPORTS, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/library/annualreports.htm.).
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pools adjacent to SSOs have begun to precommit to licensing their pat-
ents to all comers on a reasonable and nondiscriminatory basis. The
purpose of such precommitments is two-fold. First, other members of
the SSO may insist on such a RAND pre-commitment in order to pre-
vent hold-up once the patentee's technology is incorporated into the
standard. 8 Second, the patentees themselves often voluntarily accept
having their intellectual property rate-regulated in exchange for pre-
sumptive freedom from antitrust liability.7 9 It is as if they are settling an
antitrust claim that has not yet been brought by agreeing not to price
like a monopolist.
Additionally, RAND commitments are typically part of a package of
"fixes" designed to answer prospectively the potential antitrust attacks
that the pools are engaging in collusion or tying. In addition to the
RAND commitment, the pool typically commits to include only patents
essential to practicing the standard, which definitionally (although not
necessarily practically) excludes the possibility that the pool will contain
substitutes. Some "neutral" method is devised to ascertain what patents
are essential and thus belong in the pool. The license granted the pool
is nonexclusive-each patentee can continue to license all of its patents
on whatever terms it chooses outside the pool. An example of such a
package of fixes is the precommitments of the 6C and 3C DVD patent
pools, both of which received positive business review letters from the
Department of Justice in the late 1990s.
8
1
Such voluntary rate-setting provisions typically differ in one important
regard from judicial rate setting under consent decrees: the patentees
grant the rate-setting power to a neutral person, such as an arbitrator,
rather than to a judge. For example, the current 6C license agreement
calls for any dispute between licensors and licensees as to the determina-
tion of RAND terms and conditions to be "determined by an expert
jointly appointed and paid by Licensee and Licensor or the other mem-
ber of the Group. 8' Separately, the agreement contains a clause calling
78See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND IN-
TELLECTUAL. PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 46 (2007),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/innovation/P040101Promotinglnnovationand
Competitionrpt0704.pdf.
79See generally Crane, supra note 41.
80 The history of the DVD Forum is recounted in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v.
Cinram International, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 2d 370, 373-74 (D. Del. 2004). See http://www.
usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/2121.pdf [hereinafter 3C Business Review Letter] for
the 3C pool letter and http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/2485.pdf for the 6C
pool letter.
sI DVD 6C Multiformat License V3.0, 1 3.2 (in use beginningJan. 1, 2005) (on file with
author).
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for arbitration of claims between licensors and licensees to occur under
the auspices of the American Arbitration Association under the Interna-
tional Arbitration Rules of the International Centre for Dispute Resolu-
tion.8 2 This apparently creates a two-stage dispute resolution process
with an initial informal mediation by an industry expert and then the
possibility of escalation to formal arbitration.
There is, of course, a natural question as to whether arbitrators se-
lected by the patentees will be sufficiently independent to protect con-
sumers' interests in reasonably set royalty rates.83 But assuming that such
questions can be resolved satisfactorily, the RAND precommitments of-
fer an intriguing glimpse into the preferences of intellectual property
owners constantly operating on the borders of antitrust liability. They
are glad to trade the ostensible foundation of property rights-the right
to exclude-for relief from the threat of antitrust regulation.
B. BEYOND LIABILITY, TOWARD LIABILITY?
Judicial rate setting implicates "liability rules" in two different ways.
On the one hand, with the historical failure of no-fault monopolization
proposals, 84 courts only administer antitrust remedies once they have de-
termined that the defendant is liable under the antitrust laws. This is a
vestige of the historical choice to adopt a "crime-tort" model for anti-
trust conduct cases, which requires the identification of an affirmative
bad act, rather than conceiving of antitrust as a form of corporate regu-
lation.85 On the other hand, when courts do engage in rate setting (or
threaten to do so), they are treating the intellectual property right as a
liability right-the right to collect a reasonable royalty from others who
use the invention.
The voluntary choice of some intellectual property holders to trade
one kind of liability for the other-diminishing the prospect of antitrust
liability in exchange for having their intellectual property treated as a
liability right rather than a property right-is suggestive of how courts,
the enforcement agencies, and even Congress should think about the
uses and abuses of intellectual property. Despite the risks of undercom-
82 Id. 6.4.
83 See, e.g., 3C Business Review Letter, supra note 80, at 12 (expressing deep skepticism
that experts retained and paid for by the pool to determine which patents were essential
would be truly neutral).
84 See generally Crane, supra note 77, at 28-32.
85 Id.
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pensation when courts engage in rate setting for intellectual property,8 6
intellectual property rights holders do not invariably prefer property
rules to liability rules. The value of the "right to exclude" stick is relative
to what other sticks are allowed to be in the bundle. Intellectual prop-
erty rights holders are often quite willing to trade the-right-to-exclude
stick for other sticks, such as the right to bundle intellectual property
rights in licenses, to establish technological standards with competitors,
and to pool patents with rivals.8 7 Judicial rate regulation (or its shadow)
is sometimes not so much a burden as a welcome relief from other,
greater burdens.
IV. CONCLUSION
I will reveal my skepticism about the need for much antitrust enforce-
ment against dominant firm behavior when I say that in an economy
characterized by efficient capital markets, high rates of innovation, tech-
nological change, and labor mobility, and perpetual demographic
change, long-lasting private monopoly power (apart from that conferred
by the government itself) is rare. Nonetheless, where antitrust interven-
tion is appropriate, my skepticism about judicial rate setting for intellec-
tual property is less than my skepticism about the Section 2 enterprise
more broadly. Actual judicial rate setting is relatively rare, and its mere
threat may have a salutary effect on the bargain in the court's shadow.
Disciplining dominant firms' intellectual property licensing behavior
through the threat ofjudicial rate setting is a relatively non-intervention-
ist yet effective remedy.
86 See generally Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of the Cathedral: The Dominance of Property
Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2093 (1997) (arguing that "[t]he risk of undercompensation in
such situations [where courts employ liability rules] is pervasive").
87 I develop this point more fully in Intellectual Liability, supra note 48.
[Vol. 76
2009] BARGAINING IN THE SHADOW OF RATE-SETTING COURTS 327
APPENDIX
RATE-SETTING PROVISIONS IN DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE DECREES
Year of
Defendant Consent Decree Rate-Setting Decisions/Year
American Bosch 1942 0
Bendix Aviation 1942 0*
National Lead 1945 0
Diamond Match 1946 0
Line Material 1948 0*
American Optical
88  1948 1 (1950)
Phillips Screw 1949 0*
General Electric 1949 0*
Standard Register 1949 0*
ASCAP 1950 8 (1970, 1987, 1989, 1994, 1995,
1997, 1999, 2004, 2008)
Technicolor Inc. 1950 0*
3M 1950 0*
Continental Can 1950 0*
Textile Machine Works 1950 0
Kelsey-Hayes Wheel 1951 0*
Permutit Co. 1951 0
General Electric
89  1953 0
Switzer Bros. 1953 0*
Bearing Distributors 1953 0*
Servel, Inc. 1954 0*
Hunter Douglas 1954 0*
Bendix Aviation 1954 0
Kodak
9 °  1954 0
Pittsburgh Crushed Steel 1954 0*
Magcobar, Inc. 1954 0*
General Railway Signal Co. 1955 0
American Steel Foundries 1955 0*
New Wrinkle 1955 0*
Michigan Tool 1956 0*
88 United States v. Am. Optical Co., 95 F. Supp. 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
89 United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp. 835 (D.N.J. 1953).
90 United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 853 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D.N.Y. 1994).
ANTITRUST LAW JouRNAL [Vol. 76
Logal Corp. 1956 0*
General Shoe 1956 0*
Crown Zellerbach Co. 1956 0*




IBM92  1956 0
National Screen Service 1957 0
Joseph A. Krasnov 1957 0*
Robert Shaw-Fulton. Controls 1957 0*
RCA 1958 0
B.F. Goodrich 1958 0
Borg-Warner 1962 0*
Driver Harris 1964 0
Singer 1964 0
Becton Dickinson 1964 0
American Cyanamid 1964 0*
Dymo Industries 1967 0*
United Shoe 1969 0*
Scott Paper 1969 0*
3M 1969 0*
Manufacturers Aircraft Ass'n
9 3  
1975 0
BMI 1994 2 (2001, 2007)
Miller Industries9 4  2000 0
* Indicates that docket sheet information was unavailable for these cases.
91 United States v. Western Elec. Co., 409 F.2d 1377 (3d Cir. 1969).
92 Final Judgment, United States v. IBM, No. 72-344 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 1956).
93 United States v. Mfrs. Aircraft Ass'n, 1975 WL 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
94 United States v. Miller Indus., Inc., 2000 WL 33141220 (D.D.C. 2000).
